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Abstract
In this thesis, I have constructed a model in which three distinct actors are in a
complicated relationship and sought three answers to the following three main questions.
The rst one is about the analysis of customerspurchase decisions under the condition
of not having information about prices of goods and valuations for that goods before
traveling the shopping mall. The second one is related to the analysis of the price
decisions of two similar retail stores in the case of charged rental contracts managed by
the shopping mall. The last one is the analysis of the determination of parking fee that
is known by the customers in advance and of optimum rent contracts including xed and
percentage rent. It is found that the equilibrium parking fees are always less than the
marginal cost of supplying parking spaces, which implies that the mall determines the
parking fee as a loss leader. The second result is that the price of goods are determined
at the monopoly prices even if they sell a similar type of products, which the market
tends to compete. And the last result is that shopping mall must implement positive
percentage rent toward stores to increase its prot, which perfectly complies with data
related to rent leases in shopping centers.
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S¸EH·IR DIS¸INDA BULUNAN AVMLERDE MÜS¸TER·ILER,
MA¼GAZALAR VE AVM ARASINDAK·I ·IL·IS¸K·I
Gökhan Güven
Ekonomi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2016
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Eren ·Inci
Anahtar Kelimeler : de¼gerlemede belirsizlik; kira sözles¸mesi; tekel yatlama; zarar
lideri; park yeri ücreti; al¬¸sveri¸s merkezi.
Özet
Bu tezde, üç farkl¬aktörün karmas¸¬k bir ili¸ski içerisinde bulundu¼gu bir model ku-
rulmaktad¬r. Aktörler aras¬ndaki bu ili¸skilere dayanarak üç temel sorunun cevab¬aran-
maktad¬r. ·Ilk soru AVM (al¬¸sveri¸s merkezi)yi ziyaret etmeden önce ürün yatlar¬ve
bu ürünler hakk¬ndaki de¼ger biçmeleri eksik olan müs¸terilerin sat¬n alma kararlar¬n¬n
incelenmesiyle ilgilidir. ·Ikinci soru, AVM tarandan kiraland¬r¬lan ve ayn¬tip say¬lan
iki tane perekande sat¬¸s ma¼gazas¬n¬n ürünlerini yatlama karar¬n¬n incelenmesidir. Ve
son olarak da müs¸teriler taraf¬ndan bilinen park yeri ücretlerinin AVM taraf¬ndan be-
lirlenmesi ve AVMnin en uygun kira sözles¸mesini belirlemesinin incelenmesidir. Denge
park ücretlerinin her zaman için park yerlerinin marjinal maliyetinden düs¸ük oldu¼gu
bulunmus¸tur. Bu durum s¸unu belirtmektedir; AVMler kendi karlar¬n¬artt¬rmak için
park yat ücretlerini zarar lideri olarak belirler. ·Ikinci sonuç pazar¬n rekabete yönlendi-
rece¼gi ayn¬tip ürün satan iki ma¼gaza olsa bile, bu ma¼gazalar¬n ürün yat seviyesinin
tekel yat seviyesinde belirlendi¼gidir. Son olarak AVM ma¼gazalara kar¸s¬n verilerle tam
uyumlu pozitif yüzdelik kira uygulamal¬d¬r
v
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1 Introduction
Shopping mall is a particular form of building in which many stores located side by
side to ensure some certain goods that are mostly desired by customers. These might
be called as a modern type of bazaar place in many aspects. There are over than
100,000 shopping malls only in the US according to annual surveys conducted in 2015
references. All of these provide parking spaces for visitors irrespective of being a buyer,1
and most of them determine parking fee level as free.2 Even though we know that all
services provided by the private sector are priced out and also parking is costly to
supply, how can we categorize this parking for free? Even if not chosen as free, the
parking fee is always determined at the level which is less than the marginal cost of
supplying a parking space (Ersoy, Hasker, and Inci, 2016).3 That is to say, we note
that the mall as in other models always determines the parking lot price as loss leaders.
It is our rst concern that will be examined in this paper. Another concern will be
elaborated in our model is about rental contracts charged to stores by shopping malls
management. Needless to say, the shopping mall cares about the net rental revenue
collected from stores that are assigned a space to expose their goods. However, if not
formed wisely, these contracts make rental revenue underpriced, which might then end
up with inadequate rent income for malls. So, we come to our second concern: How
are lease contracts being constructed in order to make a maximum prot especially by
adopting percentage rent strategy? Lastly, we are concerned about the determination
process of prices of goods sold at stores located in malls. In our model, we assume that
two identical stores are targeting the same customer mass endeavor to sell their goods.
To put it all in simple terms, they are competing for the same market. However, we nd
that the price level that is directly a¤ected by the rent cost occurs the level higher than
competitive price. It is carried out at the monopoly market price. Our last concern is
as follow: How can stores determine the price level maximizing the sales volume in the
presence of charged to rent contracts?
Based on the studies and the gures in the literature, we would like to seek relation-
1They allocate 4 to 6 parking spaces for 1000 square feet of gross leasable area, which means that
an amount of area allocated for parking is larger than the amount of area assigned for stores.
2In a survey made by the International Council of Shopping Centers and Urban Land Institute
(2003), 94% of shopping malls set no parking fee, and only 2 % of malls declared that they set a
parking fee for parking lots. and rest of the shopping mall (%4) did not want to give an answer.
3Actually, the parking for free does not imply that customers do not pay any money in exchange
for using a parking lot. Frankly speaking, this cost is embedded into prices of goods sold at stores,
which have been shown by Hasker and Inci (2014). In other words, by increasing the price of goods,
they try to o¤set the loss sourced from setting a parking fee less than its marginal cost.
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ships among owner of the shopping mall, stores that are competing in the same market
and customers. By taking this into consideration, we attempt to analyze three primary
objectives:
(i) To determine the optimal parking fee in the case of customers who do not know
their valuations and the realized prices before visiting the shopping mall
(ii) To nd a mechanism that provides positive percentage rent charged to stores by
shopping malls; and
(iii) To analyze the price decisions of stores when competing with each other by
selling homogenous goods.4
2 Literature Review
A substantial amount of study has been done on the subject of researching parking fee
decisions of shopping malls and examining price determinations of stores in duopoly
markets. Our literature review not only gives a brief summary of related papers but
also focuses on articles providing a mechanism that analyzes a rental contract o¤ered
to stores by shopping malls. Konishi and Sandfort (2002) construct a model in which
retail stores make a decision about whether or not to advertise their products in two
di¤erent market conditions: monopolistic settings and duopoly settings. Our model is
similar to theirs in the sense that we both assume that customers do not know prices of
goods sold at stores and their valuations about that goods in advance in both settings.
In monopolistic case, they show that the optimal decision made by the retail stores
is to select price advertising for only one good despite the fact that the goods sold at
that stores are substitutes. It is recognized that the stores prefer the low priced goods
to be advertised on this setting so that it attracts more customers to visit the mall,
which increases the probability of selling goods. They present, then, the duopoly case.
In this market, two rms are selling the same type of commodity in collocation setting
in which a customer needs not to pay a search cost so as to travel. The advertising
decision made by only one store may lead to the existence of free-riderproblem. The
store which is not advertising the price of the good it sells may highly benet from
advertising decision of the other store. As a result of this, they have concluded that
the game played between the retail stores mostly seems prisoners dilemmainstead of
battle of sexeswhich reects the ultimate nding of their paper.
Some other papers investigate the inuence of existence of anchor store (department
store) on other stores in a shopping mall located in suburban area. Konishi and Sandfort
4This thesis builds on work with Eren Inci and Antonio Russo.
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(2003) has an excellent article analyzing on how a positive externality created by anchor
store can be explained by developing a mathematical model comprising only one anchor
store and many retailers. They, in fact, present the model in which customers know the
realized price of goods sold in anchor store, but they do not achieve the prices of goods
sold in retailer stores and their valuations on that goods. Just because of this reason,
they need to visit the mall for learning how much money they will pay to purchase
one good sold in retailer stores. The inference they draw from the model constructed
apprehensibly is that the presence of one anchor store can easily compensate losses
caused by high competition among stores by relatively increasing mall tra¢ c that
augments the possibility of selling one good per customer who visits the mall. They
also check their results by using numerical examples to compute sensitivity in the case
of changes in parameters. They, then, make the model to be more well dened to
eliminate problems related to discrete optimization of shopping mall and unfavorable
prot equations of retailers.
Brueckner (1993) develops another model to explain allocation problem in shopping
malls in the existence of inter-store externalities generated by anchor store for the
benet of itself and other stores. He constructs a model in which each store can create
positive externality to other stores based on space allocated by an owner of the mall
and stores types. In the article, Brueckner draws a conclusion that in the presence
of department store (anchor store) the space allocation problem must be identied by
internalizing inter-store externalities to obtain optimal result providing highest prot
for the shopping mall. It needs to be noted that the author only assumes inter-store
externality as an important factor in customer drawing power, which has been shown
to some extent in a paper written by Yuo and Lizieri (2013). The di¤erence between
our model and the model constructed by Brueckner is that we will theoretically explain
how positive percentage rent can be implemented for earning a more net prot by a
shopping mall. In this sense, Brueckner fails to identify the percentage rent as getting a
positive value. Instead of taking the positive value as we found out, he nds a negative
percentage rent and then called it as the subsidygenerating higher prot.
Another important paper is Anchor Stores written by Konishi and Sandfort
(2003). They assume one anchor store and n retail stores that have same features
in the model. The model assumes that while anchor store sells low value and normal
goods, the retail stores try to sell more specialized goods that create high expected
value. Customers have prior information about price and valuations of goods sold at
anchor store, but they do not know anything related to price levels and valuations of
goods sold at retail stores. That is why anchor store is more known by customers be-
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cause of the fact that customers are more familiar with brands sold at that stores. The
model also assumes that anchor stores inherently provide substantive externality for
all stores by increasing the number of customers visiting the mall. They have shown
that these stores have many incentives to collocate even if in the presence of competi-
tion between each other. They have also checked their results by making a numerical
example.
Eppli and Shilling (1995) build up a model to explain the cross-patronage rate be-
tween anchor store and retailer stores from the viewpoint of development opportunities
in a large-scale shopping center. Their model di¤ers from the model constructed by
Brueckner (1993) in the sense that Brueckners model takes the mall as given while Ep-
pli and Shilling (1995) seek the opportunities to improve the conditions of a large-scales
shopping mall to maximize prot. The model consists of many anchor stores and many
retailer stores, whose number of sales is directly based on a measure of leasable rental
space. The model gives two important results. The rst one is that an increment in
cross-patronage rate always brings about augmentation in this type of shopping mall
development opportunities. Secondly, if the cross patronage rate goes up, the mall have
an opportunity to expand its leasable area to obtain more renting revenues, especially
from the anchor stores.
There are also empirical articles concerning about data set of mall store contracts.
The rst research determining the variables that directly a¤ect shopping center ten-
antsleases is The Determinants of Shopping Center Rentswritten by Sirmans and
Guidry (1992). They use weighted least square estimation method to disclose internal
determinants. Therefore, they lay emphasis on customer drawing poweras a primary
factor that inuences a rent contract between stores and shopping malls. Upon their
article to be published, the general tendency in studying shopping center rents would
be turned towards understanding the rent contracts charged to stores creating more
customer attraction to malls.
The best-known one is a paper written by Gould, Pashigian, and Predergast (2005).
They mainly concern on rental contracts to understand how these are being become
dissimilar when charging to anchor stores and retailer stores in a shopping mall. In
this empirical study, they are rstly interested in analyzing why the anchor stores pay
an only small portion of total rent earned by mall even though they keep hold of over
half of total leasable space. They nd that the anchor stores are charged small rent
because they are creating positive externalities by attracting more customers to the
shopping mall, which leads to making more sales for each type of store. Therefore, to
be internalized these externalities generated by the anchor stores, they can implement
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the following policies: they can either be subsidized or made contractual provisions
promoting maximum performance, which provides an explanation in many respects of
why anchor stores receive highly rental discounts. Consequently, the results that are
coming up with examining data sets perfectly match with optimal allocation of space
within the shopping mall.
In our base model, we have modeled the percentage rent along with the xed rent.
Apart from shopping centers, in general, rent is gathered only xed amount that has
no connection with sales volume. For that reason, there is a limited number of papers
hypothesizing why shopping malls also add a clause about percentage payment based
on their gross income in rent contracts. Benjamin, Boyle, and Sirmans (1990) have
proposed that percentage rent is used as an alternative to base rent. It creates fairer
implementation on retail stores in collecting rent payments. Brueckners model (1993)
has suggested percentage rent as a tool providing that the retail stores have incentives to
cooperate with each other. In other words, Brueckner has modeled that the percentage
rent can be adjusted to stimulate retail stores acting as a whole, which leads to being
gathered more leasing payments on behalf of shopping malls owner. An alternative
view about a presence of percentage rent in leases has been propounded by Miceli and
Sirmans (1995). We know that the contracts only depend on xed rent include higher
risk factors in the sense that when tenant encounters any business risk, failure to pay
xed rent may arise to some extent. Miceli and Sirmans have suggested that percentage
rent should be implemented as a way of risk-sharing arrangement. By increasing the
weight of percentage rent in leases, the shopping malls can minimize the risk might
appear as a form of failure to pay rent. It can be counted as insurance mechanism
in some way. Another paper on this issue is written by Wheaton (2000). He totally
conicts with these remarks and puts forward that rent based on a percentage of sales
protects retailers benets against the opportunistic behavior of shopping malls owner
in the case of clash of interests between tenants and landlords. The percentage rent
carried out in our model holds the mixed features of these views.
There exists a little body of papers that have analyzed the economic explanation of
how parking fee price is determined by the shopping mall. Our model is also related
to parking fee pricing. We know from an article written by Jakle and Scculle (2004)
that the total amount of land allocated for parking approximately equals to a multiple
of New England states. The rst paper in this eld is Sutherlands article (1959)
titled Shopping Center Parking Problems. He comes up with factors bringing about
main problems in shopping malls. Subsequent articles study parking problems in malls.
Hasker and Inci (2014) construct a model in which customers, who are risk-averse,
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reach shopping mall only by using a car. In this paper, stores sell a single type of
good for simplicity and the mall market structure is not matter regarding whether or
not having monopoly power or prices competitively. The last but not the least is that
customers must incur the parking fee cost (if positive) in order to visit the mall whether
or not that they can nd out buyable goods. Given this setup, they explain how the
costs of parking fee have been embedded into prices of commodities sold at stores in
the shopping mall. According to them, economic reason behind why the parking fee is
determined as free is that it encourages the risk-averse customers to visit the mall for
searching desired commodities. In our setting, the shopping mall also sets parking fee
as a loss leader, which are consistent with the established literature. The important
point that must be highlighted is that even though we have found the same result about
parking fee decision while Hasker and Inci (2014) take stores and shopping mall as one
united entity, we assume that stores and shopping mall are two di¤erent entities.
There is one relevant article mainly concentrating on relationship between parking
tari¤s and turnover, whose volume is directly based on the level of the parking tari¤,
which is obtained by shopping mall. Mingardo and van Meerkerk (2012) write an em-
pirical article using data sets acquired a survey about 80 malls located in Netherlands.
It makes sense to note that a log-linear regression analysis is exerted as a tool of rough
econometric calculation. As a beginning, they investigate the truth of a well-known
doctrine no parking, no business. The doctrine clearly places a great emphasis on
providing parking areas to customers to obtain higher revenues. Upon analyzing data
sets mentioned above, they come up with three theoretical results clarifying the rele-
vance between the space supplied as a form of parking lotand the extent of business
of a shopping mall. The rst and most important one they nd is that there is an
undeniable and non-negligible relationship between parking fees and revenues obtained
by the shopping mall. This outcome might help us to identify our parking fee results
will be discussed in the model part of the paper. The second consequence they explore
in the whole database is that the parking fee charged to customers do not have any
impact on parking turnover of a shopping mall. This result is a direct response to the
fundamental question of this article explained above. Once and for all, they nd that in
regional shopping areas increase in the parking fees end up with an increase in parking
turnover.
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3 The Model
In this part of the paper, we investigate the relationship among shopping mall, stores,
and customers. Our model builds on Konishi (2002). Assume that there is a monopolist
shopping mall located in a suburban area. It chooses total rent composed of percentage
rentand xed rent, to be paid by stores. We use subscript r to denote percentage
rent, that is, rent paid based on a percentage of gross sales. We use R to indicate
xed rent, that is, paid regardless of the amount of sale. The only way to reach to the
shopping mall is to use on their vehicles. The shopping mall supplies parking spaces to
customers coming to the mall. Its marginal cost of supplying a parking space is cp > 0:
The shopping mall also sets parking fee denoted f; which is widely known. That is
to say, before visiting the shopping mall, customers know how much they will pay in
return for using parking space, which directly inuences the customersdecisions about
whether or not to visit the mall.
There are two stores selling an indivisible and homogeneous good.5 The marginal
cost of providing the good in the store is denoted m > 0. The prices of goods are
denoted by pi; where i = 1; 2. There is a continuum of customers whose preferences
are identical, but transportation costs are di¤erent. We call them customers, whether
they visit the shopping mall or not. Each customers valuation (willingness to pay)
for good i, vi, is i.d.d. random variable (over customers), distributed uniformly over
the closed interval [0; 1]. The valuations of goods sold by stores are also stochastically
independent. It means that realized valuation of one good does not have any e¤ect on
other goodsrealized valuations. We should note that customers do not have knowledge
in advance how much they are willing to pay for goods, which implies that any customer
who visits the shopping mall (incurring transportation cost) discovers her valuations
for goods i = 1; 2 as two independent uniform distribution drawn (it will be visualized
later). Before visiting the shopping mall, they do not know not only the price of good
but also their willingness to pay for that good. As we noted earlier, the customers only
know in advance how much cost they will incur in order to park their vehicles in parking
lots provided by the shopping mall. Upon visiting the shopping mall, the customers
can learn realized prices and their valuations for the good. And the last thing must be
emphasized is that all customers have the alternative option purchasing nothing, which
yields a net negative surplus.6
5The goods has no di¤erentiation concerning features, quality levels, and benets.
6The negative net surplus is taken because even if customers do not buy any good from both stores,
they still pay parking fee.
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As we mentioned before, each customers valuation of goods is revealed only upon
incurring of a transportation cost. We denote transportation cost as t > 0. The
transportation cost is evaluated in a way to reect a customers position relative to
the position of the shopping mall. It can be explained as follows: one has to incur
a transportation cost depending on how far his home away from the mall. We also
assume that t has a uniform distribution over the closed interval [0; 1] (it should be
added the following note that the shopping mall is placed at 0; and the customers are
uniformly distributed on a line of unit length). Once the transportation cost is incurred,
it becomes sunk cost. That is, it cannot be recovered any longer. The result is that
any customers whose transportation costs are less than the gross expected utility from
shopping at the shopping mall will hit the road to arrive in the mall.
Given this specication, the game is played by the owner of a shopping mall, stores
and customers.7 The timing of events is as follows. The shopping mall rst o¤ers
the rental contracts to stores specifying percentage rent (r) and xed rent (R); and it
also determines the parking fee (f). Then, by taking into account individual costs of
transportation and expected net surplus after incurring transportation costs, customers
decide whether or not to travel the shopping mall. It should always be kept in mind
that prices are not publicly known. The market size, descriptive of how many customers
visit the mall, is also determined at this stage. Upon learning percentage rent and xed
rent, the stores determine price levels for their goods. The nal stage is that soon
afterward the customers visiting the mall by own vehicle pay a parking fee, f; and
incur a transportation cost, t, purchasing decision for each customer is taken place.8
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is the our equilibrium notion. There-
fore, we solve the model that is constructed above by backward induction. We are
beginning with the analysis of customers purchase decision at the next step.
3.1 The customerspurchase decision (Stage 5)
We start o¤ by analyzing the nal stage of the game. It should be noted that all
decisions about rent levels and price levels made by the stores and the shopping mall
are taken as xedat this stage.9 The purchase decision of customers who have chosen
to visit the shopping mall is also examined at this stage. The customers have basically
two options: purchasing a good from one store or nothing (the customers can buy
7As it is explicitly seen, we do not take the shopping mall and stores as one economic entity.
8The realized valuations for each good are decided by nature upon prices are announced by stores
9Taking these as xed is important especially in derivative and integral calculations.
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only one good that ensures them the maximum net surplus even if other goods provide
positive net surplus). At this stage, it is clearly useful to indicate that the prices set
by stores and customerswillingness to pay for goods are unquestionably known by the
customers.
The customers solve the following maximization problem:
max[ f;max
i=1;2
vi   pi   f ] (1)
This maximization problem can be explained verbally in such a way that a customer
purchases a good that ensures his maximum net surplus or prefers the option of not
purchasing any good that gives his negative net surplus (notwithstanding buying noth-
ing, she still pays a parking fee that brings about negative net surplus). Given the
prices (pi; pj), where i = 1; 2, the probability that a customer purchases good i is given
by10
P (pi; pj) =
1 pj+piZ
pi
(vi   pi + pj)dvi +
1Z
1 pj+pi
dvi if pi  pj
1 pj+piZ
pi
(vi   pi + pj)dvi if otherwise (2)
The equation identied above is the general equation of the probability that a good
purchased in the case of determined stores prices. The gure in below is a useful
tool to make explicit the above equation. The rst concept that should be emphasized
is that the line represents the following formula: v1   p1 = v2   p2: Each customer
on this line is indi¤erent between purchasing at store 1 and store 2: In other words,
these customers do not care about to buy a good from either store. The area under
the line (v1   p1 = v2   p2) represents the customers who purchase good 1 (v1  p1
and v1   p1  v2   p2). Given that valuations for good i = 1; 2 are independent
uniform random variables, the areas under the line might be evaluated as the measure
of customers purchasing good 1.11 The areas above the line are the probability of
purchasing goods from store 2 whose price level is higher than the price level of goods
10Upper case P is used to denote the probability taking values in [0; 1] interval.
11The high probability for store 1 equals to 12   p1 + p2   p
2
2
2 when p1  p2; otherwise, the low
probability 12   p1 + p
2
1
2 + p2   p1p2:
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sold at store 1. The area is written as No Purchase gives us the probability of
purchasing nothing from both stores because of the fact that the realized valuations are
less than the prices for both goods. It is important to emphasize that in spite of the
fact that one store chooses its price level higher than the price level of another store,
it is still selling the good presented in its store because of di¤erentiation on valuations
for each customer. It comes to mean that the customers pay attention not only the
price levels set by stores but also the quality of goods, features, and other benets when
taking purchasing decision. For this reason, the competition between both stores is not
called Walrasian Perfect Competition. To put it in another way, since the valuations are
distributed independently and getting di¤erent values for each customer, the variation
between their valuations and the realized prices occurs at di¤erent levels. For example,
assume that a customer whose valuation for commodity 1 is higher than valuation for
commodity 2: However, the price of commodity 1 is also higher than the price level
for commodity 2. Even if the valuation for commodity 1 is higher, since a di¤erence
between the valuation for commodity 2 and the price of commodity 2 is higher, and
then the customer will prefer purchasing the commodity sold at store 2.
Since stage 4 is basically the Natures move, it does not need to be analyzed deeply,
so we can skip stage 4 and continue with stage 3 (storesprice decision).
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3.2 The storesequilibrium price decision (Stage 3)
At this stage, customers do not have prior knowledge about prices set by stores before
visiting the shopping mall, but they can make reasonable expectations about stores
price policies by the virtue of the fact that customers can be counted as rational. The
customers must decide whether or not to travel to the shopping mall for the purpose of
learning their valuations for that goods and storesprices. This is important because of
the following reason: transportation cost becomes sunk cost when visiting the shopping
mall. It also should be noted that any change in storesprices does not a¤ect customers
transportation decision. The underlying reason is that despite the fact that store makes
a decision to shrink price level for its good, the number of customers incurring the
transportation cost is not a¤ected due to the fact that the customers do not know in
advance how much the price level is altered and in which level new price is determined.
That is to say; the market size is called xedwithout considering the price level set
by stores. The customers anticipate the prices that are determined by a xed market
size. As a summary, we can say that the market size is called to have scale e¤ectand
does not have any inuence on storesequilibrium prices in our model. As a result of
this, we completely ignore the presence of the market size in writing prot equations of
both stores.
We set sight on symmetric price equilibrium, bearing in mind that stores set equal
prices p1 = p2 = p: By the reason of the fact that we are looking for a symmetric
solution in prices given vi   pi  0; assume that stores set price pi where i = 1; 2: By
taking into consideration the customers who visit the shopping mall, store is prot per
unit demand is written by
s(pi) = P (pi)[(1  r)pi  m)] R: (3)
In the above equation, as a relevant remainder, r represents the percentage rent and
R refers the xed rent. We should note that the shopping mall takes gross prot gained
by stores by using R: We also have the marginal cost of providing the good denoted
by m. The store i is getting revenue (1   r)pi  m with P (pi) probability calculated
in stage 5. It also pays xed rent of R. Then the prot per unit demand is written as
above equation.
The price p is evaluated a symmetric equilibrium price if it satises succeeding
equation, (p; p)  (pi; p) for any pi  0 set by the stores i = 1; 2: Then, we have
the following proposition
Proposition 1. The symmetric equilibrium store price p is unique and implicitly
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dened by the following equation:
p =  1 
p
2
p
(r   1)(r   1 m)
r   1 : (4)
Proof of Proposition 1. The proposition mentioned above is proved in here. A
Nash equilibrium (p1; p

2) can be assessed in this context like below:
1(p

1; p

2)  1(p1; p2) for p 2 [0; 1]
2(p

1; p

2)  2(p1; p2) for p 2 [0; 1] (5)
The symmetric Nash equilibrium must be providing as the following equation:
@i
@pi
=
@j
@pj
=
1
2
(p1   1)( 3 + 2m+ p1   4p2 + 2r)
=m(1  p1 + p2)  1
2
(1 + 3p21 + 2p2   4p1(1 + p2))(r   1); (6)
where pi = pj = p
Then by rearranging the equivalence properly, we can nd the symmetric Nash
equilibrium (p) satisfying the above equation is
p =  1 
p
2
p
(r   1)(r   1 m)
r   1 : (7)
p is the unique best response to p and called as the unique symmetric Nash equi-
librium because of the fact that i(pi ; p

j)  i(pi; p) for any pi 2 [0; 1]:12
3.3 Equilibrium market size (Stage 2)
We have obtained the equilibrium prices set by stores at the previous stage. Now by
taking into account the equilibrium price p(pi) calculated at the previous stage, the
customers must decide whether or not to visit the shopping mall. This is because the
customers need to be sure that those goods they intend to satisfy their expectations
or desires. One can reach this information only through one channel, but it is costly
12i(pi; pj) is strictly quasi-concave.
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because of transportation cost and parking fee.13 When we aggregate each customers
decision by considering whether or not they visit the mall, the number of the customers
who visits the shopping mall will be found out. Our analysis is entirely dependent on
the results found at stage 5. We can formalize a customers expected utility from the
shopping mall at prices (pi;pj) as follows (We can assume that pi  pj)14:
E(maxf f; vi   pi   f; vj   pj   fg) =
1 pj+piZ
pi
(vi   pi + pj) (vi   pi   f)dvi+
1Z
1 pj+pi
(vi   pi   f)dvi +
1Z
pj
(vj   pj + pi)
(vj   pj   f)dvj +
piZ
0
(pj) ( f)dvi: (8)
Firstly, we clarify the functions of mathematical operators used at above equation
for better understanding. Integration serves for the purpose of yielding the expected
payo¤ over all realizations vi. In our model, it is important to note that each customer
has an option to purchase nothing. So, even if a customer decides not to purchase any
good o¤ered by both stores, he still pays the parking fee (f ), which leads him to get
negative surplus. It is crucial to note that the customer buys a good i only when vi  pi
and vi  pi  vj   pj are satised. To be more precise, the rst two terms starting with
integration reect the condition in which a customer purchases good 1 and the third
term starting with integration states the condition in which a customer purchases good
2; but the last term represents the case where a customer does not purchase any goods
sold in both stores because of not providing positive payo¤ after being bought. In other
words, the customers do not nd any buyable good in both stores specied according
to the last term. However, in each case, the parking fee must be paid independently of
purchasing or not purchasing a good.
In order that a customer prefers visiting the mall, this condition must be satised;
his expected gross surplus is greater than or equal to his transportation cost. That is, if a
customers transportation cost t is lower than E(maxf f; vi pi f; vj pj fg); he will
decide to visit the shopping mall. We know that the transportation costs vary according
13These customers can be assumed to have insu¢ cient information about some traits of goods. In
our model, to solve this issue, they must see the good in stores.
14It can be assumed such that pj  pi:In each case, the formulation gives us the same result.
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to distance from the shopping mall. It increases if a customer is located further away
from the shopping mall. Then, we need to assure that a customer whose transportation
cost t(pi; pj)  E(maxf f; vi pi f; vj pj fg) to be indi¤erent between travelling
and not travelling the shopping mall. Then, the market size ((pi; pj)) is computed as
follows:
(pi; pj) =
t(pi;pj)Z
0
dt = t(pi; pj): (9)
That is,15
(pi; pj) =
1 pj+piZ
pi
(vi   pi + pj) (vi   pi   f)dvi+
1Z
1 pj+pi
(vi   pi   f)dvi +
1Z
pj
(vj   pj + pi)
(vj   pj   f)dvj +
piZ
0
(pj) ( f)dvi:16 (10)
The market size identied above as a form of an equation is always getting positive
numbers regardless of the price level set by the stores and the parking fee determined
by the shopping mall. Importantly, it is easily shown that the less parking fee is
determined, the more customers can be attracted so as to visit the shopping mall,
which apparently leads to increase the purchasing probability of any good sold at both
stores.
3.4 The prot maximizing of the shopping mall (Stage 1)
Finally, we sort out the shopping malls decisions including setting optimal parking
fee; (f ) and designating equilibrium rent charged to both stores simultaneously. The
revenue of shopping mall is composed of three di¤erent parts: the percentage rent
(r), the xed rent (R) (both charged to stores) and parking fee (f ). The owner
of a shopping mall sets the xed rent (R) to receive all prots in the hands of the
stores. Simultaneously, she determines the parking fee to get more revenue paid by the
15The market size equation can be written easily by interchanging pi and pj :
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customers.
The shopping malls total rent revenue is 2R+[2r(Pi)pi)]((pi)) (market size).17 It
is important in the sense to make sure that when optimal percentage rent is computed,
the market size is taken as a xed owing to similar logic mentioned above. For
this reason, the shopping mall is not taking the market size into consideration when
determining the percentage rent (r). Thus, the shopping mall can force the stores to
choose a higher price by setting optimal percentage rent (r): Even though there is a
competition between stores to sell out as much as the number of customers stores can
make sale, they can sell their commodities with a higher price than competitive price
because of neglecting the e¤ect of market size on optimal percentage rent.
The parking revenue collected for providing parking space to the customers is com-
puted as (f cp)market size((pi)) where cp is the marginal cost of supplying a parking
space. We should note that market size is not xedas coming up with the optimal
parking fee solution. That is, by cutting the parking fee the shopping mall can increase
the market size (the size of customers who come round the shopping mall even if they
do not nd a buyable good). As a result, the total prot of the shopping mall is as
follows:
m(r; R; pi) = 2R + [2r(Pi)pi + f   cp] (pi) (11)
Note that Pi is implicit function of vi; and pi (pi) is implicit function of f and m.
The rst derivative for the shopping malls prot-maximization equation with respect
to r is
@m(r; R; pi)
@r
=m(pi)
6
p
m+ (r   1)2  mr + 2mpm+ (r   1)2  mr
(r   1)2p(r   1)(r  m  1) +p
2( 4(1 +m) + (4 +m)r)
(r   1)2p(r   1)(r  m  1) = 0 (12)
The unique optimal r maximizing the above condition is
r =
2 +m+ 4m2 +m3  p27m2 + 18m312m4 + 6m5 +m6
2 + 4m+m2
(13)
Proposition 2. The optimal percentage rent, r; is always positive when m gets
values the range of [0,1].
17Since the model is composed of two similar stores, the rent revenue is multiplied by two.
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Proof of Proposition 2. It can be proven by using local extremum theorem. First,
we are looking for any extremum point within (0; 1) open interval.
The rst order condition of r is as follow;
(r)
0
=  2(2 +m)(2 +m+ 4m2 +m3  
p
m2(3 +m)2(3 +m2)+
(2 + (4 +m)(1 + 8m+ 3m2   3m(3 +m)(3 +m(2 +m(2 +m)))p
m2(3 +m)2(3 +m2)
(14)
The rst condition dened as above must be equal zero in order to nd the point that
gives us local minimum or local maximum point, which will be determined depending
upon the sign of the second derivation.
(r)
0
=
@r(m)
@m
=  2(2 +m)(2 +m+ 4m2 +m3  
p
m2(3 +m)2(3 +m)2)+
(2 + (4 +m)(1 + 8m+ 3m2   3m(3 +m)(3 +m(2 +m(2 +m)))p
m2(3 +m)2(3 +m2)
= 0 (15)
m that sets zero above (r)0is zero (1):And if we put m = 1 into r it will generate
local minimum r equals to 0
The second order condition of r is as follow;
(r)
00
=
@(r)
0
(m)
@m
=
216
p
m2(3 +m)2(3 +m2)
((3 +m2)
p
m2(3 +m)2(3 +m2)(2 +m(4 +m))3)
+
m(180(6 +
p
m2(3 +m)2(3 +m2))
((3 +m2)
p
m2(3 +m)2(3 +m2)(2 +m(4 +m))3)
+
m(36(28 + 3
p
m2(3 +m)2(3 +m2)):::))))))
((3 +m2)
p
m2(3 +m)2(3 +m2)(2 +m(4 +m))3)
> 0 (16)
This shows us that the second-order condition is certainly positive, which makes our
m is the local minimum point.
It is required to check out boundary points : 0; 1: We know from the above calcu-
lations, m = 1 is already local minimum point. and if m = 0, r will get 1: Then, it
can be easily said that in the closed interval [0; 1] of m; r is always getting positive
values within the closed interval [0; 1]:
Proposition 2 shows that percentage rent charged to stores by shopping mall is
always positive percentage rate. A certain amount of money based on the percentage
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rent rate is paid to the shopping mall for each good sold. That is to say, the stores get
(1  r) pi for each good sold instead of getting pi:
As we mentioned before, the shopping mall needs to determine the optimal park-
ing fee. To nd the optimal parking fee, the derivation of the shopping malls prot
maximization problem with respect to parking fee (f) must be taken. In this case,
the market size found at the preceding stage is not xed because the amount of the
parking fee directly a¤ects the market size (pi). The shopping mall is interested in the
market size in the sense that she is also getting revenue from the parking fee charged to
customers. It is known that if the parking fee decreases, the number of the customers
visiting the shopping mall can increase relatively.
m(r; R; pi) = 2R+ [2r(Pi)pi + f   cp](pi) is the shopping malls prot equation
mentioned above. Then, the rst derivative for the shopping malls prot-maximization
equation with respect to f is given by
@m(r; R; pi)
@f
=
1
243m2
(243(cp   2(2 + f))m2   378m4   216m:::)) = 018 (17)
The equilibrium parking fee (f ) is
f  =
1
486m2
(243( 4 + cp)m2   972m3   378m4:::))): (18)
When the above term is organized, we get this one:
f  =
cp
2
   : where  = 1
486
( 972m3   378m4   54m5:::)  2: (19)
Proposition 3 (Loss leader pricing). The equilibrium parking fee, f , is always
less than the shopping malls marginal cost of supplying a parking space, cp:
Loss leader pricing means that in order to attract more customers, the owner of the
shopping mall determines the parking fee level below the marginal cost of supplying a
parking space. It is important because the marginal cost of supplying a parking space
per the customer who visits the mall is very low, the shopping mall then can set the
parking fee as free, which closely matches real life data. By determining the parking
fee free, the shopping mall stimulates the customers having a chance to purchase goods
presented by stores without being incurred any charge in using parking space.
18It is a very long term. For this reason, we do not write the whole term.
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4 Conclusion
The aim of this article is to make a contribution to three distinct kinds of literatures
related to shopping malls. First, we assume that rent contracts charged to stores are
composed of two parts; xed rent and percentage rent. Rent agreements are designed
to induce retail stores more sales. We provide a shred of evidence for this structure of
rent contracts by showing that prot of shopping mall can be reached the highest levels.
In this sense, the model has highlighted that shopping malls have a strong incentive to
determine percentage rent as positiveto earn more prot. Setting positive percentage
rent is in agreement with what is shown in empirical inquiries, especially data shown by
Gould, Pashigian, and Predergast (2005). Although it seems sensual to some extent, it
needs to be explained to reveal the intuition behind the model. Further papers must
expand our results to analyze why shopping malls set positive percentage rent instead
of setting negative percentage rent which is found in Brueckners model. By doing it,
a broader theoretical explanation can be done for making sense of the process that
determines the sign of the percentage rent.
Second, considering the competitive relationships between retailer stores, we have
found that the price levels of goods sold at both stores are determined at the monopoly
price level.19 At rst appearance, it might seem strange, but we can present a strong
explanation that is compatible with previous articles written by Hasker and Inci (2012).
We have shown that the parking fee set by shopping mall is being congured to close zero
(free) in order to attract more customers. To compensate loss incurred from providing
free parking, the mall forces stores to determine price levels of goods at the monopoly
price. That is to say, the shopping mall has embedded the parking costs in the prices
of the goods sold at retailer stores. It directly stimulates the prices of retailer stores to
increase, and this might explain why the price levels have been recognized very close to
monopoly prices. It needs to be noted here that this result is somehow related to where
the shopping mall is located. In this paper, it is proved only for suburban shopping
malls. In the manner that Hasker and Inci (2014) have demonstrated, urban shopping
malls generally may determine parking fees as positive to prevent customers not have
the purpose to shop.
Third, we have found parking can be counted as a loss leader for shopping malls
located in suburban areas. The parking fee is underpriced, and mostly determined
19We have assumed that the customers do not have any prior information about the prices and
their valuations. It is important to note that customers do not react perfectly to the change in price
levels. They are only making reasonable expectations on how price level might be before visiting the
shopping mall.
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free, so as to attract more customers to the shopping mall.20 To be more precise, the
observed parking fee is zero. Even if you do not make a payment in return for using
parking lot provided by the mall, in fact, the parking cost is totally embedded into the
price of goods sold at both retailer stores as we explained above. It is implying that
instead of putting parking fee in exchange for to be used parking lots, the shopping
malls prefer to increase the price of goods. It is quite logical in this context because
the customers already do not learn realized prices without traveling the shopping mall.
We would like to analyze what further topics can be added to investigate depending
on the result we have found in this paper. It might be interesting to change the structure
of stores in which one can become anchor store that produces positive externality by
increasing customer tra¢ c in the mall, and the other one is still retailer store, which
would be made a more complicated analysis. It would also be instructive to assume
heterogeneous goods, where the price and realization of the good sold at anchor store are
known by customers, these parameters for another good is still not known by customers.
By doing this, the process of attracting customers to the mall can be altered completely.
In this case, we would be concerned how parking cost can be embedded into the prices
of anchor store and retailer store. Is there any di¤erentiation in embedding the cost
into the prices of diverse storesgoods? Answers to these kinds of questions might be
given in following research.
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